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INTRODUCTION
In 2011, California experienced a sea change in how
felons were sentenced and supervised in the state, known as
“realignment.” Lower-level offenders who were previously the
responsibility of the state are now being sentenced to serve
time and being supervised at the local level. The “risk” level
of the individual offender was all but ignored in this dramatic
change. This Article discusses how risk assessment is used in
corrections, California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR)’s prior experiences with risk-based
policies and practices, and what we might expect from

* Susan Turner is a Professor in the Department of Criminology, Law and
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local justice agencies; Julie Gerlinger is a doctoral student in the Department of
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realignment, from a risk perspective.
I. CDCR AND RISK ASSESSMENT
In 2005, the California Department of Corrections added
an “R” for “rehabilitation” to its name. 1 In late 2006, a panel
of experts in the field of corrections met over the course of
several months to examine rehabilitation programming
within the Department. The panel produced a report for the
California State Legislature that provided a roadmap for
effective offender programming—otherwise known as the
“Expert Panel Report.” 2 Central to the roadmap was the
“California Logic Model,” a system consisting of eight steps
based on empirical findings of effective programming
principles (otherwise known as “evidence-based”). 3 The first
two steps are most important for the present Article. The
first component of the Model was to evaluate the overall risk
of offender recidivism. 4 The second was to identify dynamic
risks—known as needs—that are commonly associated with
recidivism, which would be targeted for correctional
programming. 5
One might say that the CDCR was slow to join the
evidence-based movement.
Since the early 1990s, a
renaissance of the rehabilitation ideal spearheaded by the
Canadians had been gathering momentum across the United
States. 6 The Canadian model, often referred to as “RiskNeeds-Responsivity,” posits that programming should be
reserved for those offenders with the highest risk of
recidivism; criminogenic needs—those factors associated with
criminal behavior—should be the target of programming
efforts; and programs should follow principles of
responsivity. 7 The last component suggests that programs be
1. S.B. 737, 2005 S. (2005 Cal.).
2. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., A Roadmap for Effective Offender
Programming in California, Leg., at vii (2007).
3. Id. at 20.
4. Id. at 21.
5. Id. at 25.
6. DON A. ANDREWS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT AND
EFFECTIVE TREATMENT IN WHAT WORKS: REDUCING REOFFENDING (James
McGuire ed., 1995); DON ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CRIMINAL CONDUCT (5th ed. 2010,).
7. DON A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY MODEL
FOR OFFENDER ASSESSMENT AND REHABILITATION, at i (2007), http://
www.sedgwickcounty.org/corrections/resources/Risk_Need_Responsivity/Risk_N
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appropriately delivered. 8 Cognitive-behavioral and other
methods that take into account the learning styles of the
offender are most effective. 9
Despite being a relatively late adopter of evidence-based
practices, the CDCR rapidly moved forward in the
development and utilization of risk assessment tools. In late
2007 and early 2008, the CDCR, in collaboration with the
University of California, Irvine’s Center for Evidence-Based
Corrections, developed an automated risk assessment tool
utilizing automated criminal history information from the
CDCR and the California Department of Justice’s records
(i.e., “rap sheets”). 10 The California tool, known as the
California Static Risk Assessment (CSRA) was modeled on a
tool researchers had developed in Washington State, and
essentially counts up the number of prior convictions using
specified counting rules (e.g., none, one, two, three, or more)
for eighteen felony and misdemeanor categories. 11 The
convictions receive a weight, and the tool classifies each
offender in one of five different risk groups for future
recidivism: high risk “violent,” high risk “property,” high risk
“drug,” moderate, and low risk offenders. 12 Thus the tool uses
prior criminal history information to predict future risk of
recidivism. Because the tool uses automated information (as
opposed to a structured interview, which could require fortyfive minutes per offender to administer), it almost
instantaneously identifies the risk group classification for
more than ninety-five percent of offenders under CDCR
jurisdiction. 13 The CSRA is the current tool utilized in
prioritizing treatment for inmates within the institution, and
for determining recommended sanctions for parole
violations. 14 CDCR also used it in the short-lived policy
experiment with non-revocable parolees in which low- and
moderate-risk offenders, who satisfied a number of offense
eed_2007–06.pdf [hereinafter RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY].
8. ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 6.
9. Id. at 49–60.
10. Susan Turner et al., Development of the California Static Risk
Assessment Instrument (CSRA) 4 (Univ. of Cal., Irvine Ctr. for Evidence-Based
Corr. Working Paper, 2009).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Id. at 36.
14. See Turner et al., supra note 10, at 37.
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criteria (non-serious, non-violent, non-sex) and in-prison
behaviors (no prison gang affiliation, no prison violations),
were placed on a form of summary parole with no parole
agent supervision. 15 A risk-based model makes good sense.
Ideally, by identifying and targeting higher risk offenders,
scarce resources are appropriately delivered, recidivism
diminishes, returns to custody decrease, and the prison
population declines.
It is somewhat surprising, then, that California’s recently
enacted “Realignment” 16 legislation virtually ignores risk.
Realignment was passed with the expectation that it would
help the CDCR meet the prison population reduction targets
of the “Three-Judge Panel,” imposed as part of long-standing
lawsuits concerning inadequate medical and mental health
care. 17 The legislation included three major leverage points.
First, offenders whose current conviction offense was a nonserious, non-violent and non-sex offense, and who had no
prior convictions for these offenses, would no longer be
sentenced to state prison. 18 They would instead be housed or
supervised at the local level. 19 Second, inmates leaving
prison with a current non-violent, non-serious, non-sex
offense would not be placed on state parole, but would instead
be placed on Post-Release Community Supervision (or PRCS)
and supervised by local county probation departments. 20 The
third major lever is that parole violators or violations of
PRCS would no longer be sentenced to prison: they would be
handled locally, with a maximum local jail sentence of 180
days for a violation. 21 The target groups for local front-end
(section 1170(h)) sentencing and PRCS are based on those
“nonviolent,” “non-serious,” “non-sex” offenses. 22 Another way
to look at realignment is that the CDCR reserves
15. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL REPORT:
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION’S
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NON-REVOCABLE PAROLE PROGRAM (2011)
[hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT].
16. A.B. 109, 2011 Assemb. (Cal. 2011).
17. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, C01-1351
TEH, 2009 WL 2430820, at *116 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009) (ordering California to
reduce its prison population to 137.5% of design capacity within two years).
18. Cal. A.B. 109.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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responsibility for the “high stakes” offenders, those offenders
the public and policy makers fear. The only place in which
“risk” plays an explicit role is the determination of high-risk
sex offenders. 23 This is accomplished through the use of riskassessment tools originally developed for sex-offender
recidivism (the Static 99 for men and the FSORA for
women). 24
II. DO RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS WORK?
Do risk assessment tools work? A better question may be
“are they better or worse than other methods of determining
whether an offender will commit a future crime?” Are they
better than a flip of a coin? Yes. Are they better than a
clinical prediction?
Yes.
Are they 100% accurate?
Unfortunately, no. What kinds of errors do they make? Risk
assessment tools make two kinds of errors that are
worrisome. Sometimes, they “predict” that a person will
commit a crime and one is not actually committed. This is
known as a “false positive.” 25 Sometimes, they predict that
someone will be crime-free and yet, that person commits a
crime. This is known as a “false negative.” 26 In addition, risk
tools base their predictions on group aggregates, and are not
necessarily accurate at the individual level. 27 Car insurance
rates can be used as an example. A parent’s first time driver
son may be an “angel,” and never have an accident, but in the
larger population, his age and gender are associated with
more accidents and higher claims, and this, for the parent,
unfortunately, means higher insurance rates. In this case,
the son is a false positive. With false positives, more
resources or higher levels of correctional control may be
focused on someone who does not need them. False negatives
can be politically damaging. No agency wants to release a
predicted “low risk” offender, only to have the person commit
a particularly heinous crime. Political careers have been
23. See id.
24. See generally ANDREW HARRIS ET AL., STATIC-99 CODING RULES
REVISED — 2003 (2003) (The Static-99 is a ten-item risk assessment instrument
developed specifically to assess the risk level of sex offenders.).
25. See Turner et al., supra note 10, at 10–11 (discussing predictive
accuracy).
26. See id.
27. See id.
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ruined by highly publicized heinous events committed by
offenders (e.g., Willie Horton).
If we want our tool to be as accurate as possible, what
kinds of factors should we include? Research has distilled
eight core factors related to recidivism. They include:
History of antisocial behavior
• Antisocial personality pattern
• Pro-criminal attitudes
• Social support for crime
• Substance abuse
• Family/marital relationships
• School/work
• Pro-social recreational activities 28
•

The Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R), a direct
product of the “Canadian’s” risk-need-responsivity principles,
is a widely used risk assessment tool that directly
incorporates the factors above. 29 Of the above factors, all
except the first are considered “dynamic” risk factors,
otherwise known as “needs.” 30 Services and treatment can be
brought to bear on these needs, which in turn should reduce
criminal behavior. 31 Prior criminal history is considered
“static,” since it cannot be changed. 32 Generally, tools that
contain “dynamic” risk factors are considered more predictive
than tools that contain “static” factors that are immutable. 33
It is the case, however, that some jurisdictions have achieved
about the same level of predictive accuracy using risk tools
based primarily on static factors. 34 There is also controversy
in the field about the inclusion of “needs” or treatmentrelevant items in predicting the risk of recidivism, some
28. RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY, supra note 7, at 6.
29. See David J. Simourd & P. Bruce Malcolm, Reliability and Validity of
the Level of Service Inventory-Revised Among Federally Incarcerated Sex
Offenders, 13 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 261, 264 (1998). This tool is one
of the most commonly used risk and need assessment tools in the United States
and Canada. The instrument consists of fifty-four items in ten domains (e.g.,
criminal history, emotional/personal, companions).
30. RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY, supra note 7, at 5.
31. Id. at 10.
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id.
34. E.g., California’s CSRA and Washington State Institute for Public
Policy’s risk assessment instrument.
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favoring exclusion, others inclusion. 35
Other popular risk tools in the field include the Salient
Factor Score, The Correctional Assessment and Intervention
System™, and the Correctional Offender Management
Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS). 36 A complete
description of available tools is beyond the scope of this
Article, however, risk and needs tools are available for both
youth and adult populations. 37 Some are proprietary and
require payment; others are in the public domain. 38 Some
have been rigorously tested to make sure they are accurate;
others less so. 39 Many tools tap similar conceptual domains
and the evidence suggests that no one validated tool
Risk tools have what may be
outperforms another. 40
considered a modest ability to accurately predict recidivism. 41
They are by no means one hundred percent accurate.
III. ROLE OF RISK ASSESSMENT FOR COUNTIES IN
REALIGNMENT
Realignment legislation encourages the use of
alternatives to incarceration (e.g., GPS monitoring, day
reporting) and the adoption of evidence-based practices. 42 As
part of realignment, it fell to each county to develop a plan
prepared by their Community Corrections Partnership group,
consisting of law enforcement, probation, courts, corrections,
and other social service and community representatives. 43 A
recent analysis catalogued each county plan by the types of
evidence-based practices they used, as well as their use of
risk assessment tools. 44 The authors found that California
counties utilized six different risk assessment tools, including
the Static Risk and Offender Needs Guide (STRONG);
35. Jennifer Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk
Assessment, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 38, 40–41 (2011).
36. Currently being used by the CDCR in its institutions and for offenders
on parole. See, e.g., SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 16.
37. See, e.g., Angela McCray et al., Realigning the Revolving Door? An
Analysis of California Counties’ AB 109 Implementation Plans 36 (Stanford Sch.
of Law Stanford Criminal Justice Ctr. Draft Paper, 2012).
38. See, e.g., id. at 28.
39. See generally Skeem & Monahan, supra note 35.
40. Id. at 39–40.
41. See id.
42. A.B. 109, 2011 Assemb. (Cal. 2011).
43. Id.
44. McCray et al., supra note 37, at 41–43.
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COMPAS; Correctional Assessment and Intervention System
(CASI); Modified Wisconsin Risk Assessment, LS/CMI, and
the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS). 45 Seventy-eight
percent of counties indicated they would use risk assessment,
with the STRONG favored among almost half of the counties,
and COMPAS by eighteen percent. 46 The STRONG and
COMPAS assess both risk and needs, and integrate them into
the offender’s supervision process. 47 This type of tool is
commonly referred to as a “4th generation tool” — one that
goes beyond simple assessment and helps in the management
process using an automated case planning system. 48 Studies
of the risk assessment component of the STRONG and
COMPAS tools have shown that the tools are moderately
predictive of recidivism. 49
As part of the hand-off from CDCR to the counties under
realignment, pre-release packets are prepared 120 days prior
to release for inmates headed for PRCS supervision. 50 Due to
staff reductions, the CDCR is unable to conduct COMPAS
reentry assessments; however, they are providing any
assessments that may be in the inmate’s Central File. 51
The fact that the majority of counties are incorporating
risk assessment in their county plans, coupled with CDCR’s
provision of available COMPAS assessments, suggests that
risk considerations will play an important part in county
response to increased responsibility for the realigned
offenders.
A primary and “best-practice” role for risk
assessment is in the allocation of scarce resources to those
who have a higher risk of recidivism. Assessing section
1170(h) and PRCS offenders may also give counties an
indication of gaps in needed services for realigned offenders.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 43.
47. Id. at 41.
48. RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY, supra note 7, at 4–5.
49. See Elizabeth Drake & Robert Barnoski, New Risk Instrument for
Offenders Improves Classification Decisions, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB.
POLICY 4 (March 2009).
50. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND REHAB., PUBLIC SAFETY
REALIGNMENT
HANDBOOK
app.
A
(2011),
available
at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/County-Handbook-11-21-11.pdf (list of
documents contained in pre-release packets).
51. The “Central File” (or C-file) is the master paper file maintained by
CDCR that contains the records for each prisoner and parolee. CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 15, § 2000(b)(17).
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As McCray and colleagues note, “[t]he focus on risk
assessment seems to stem from the fact that counties are
worried about resource management, particularly considering
that they believe that the AB 109 [realignment] population is
going to be higher risk and higher need than the state
anticipated.” 52
IV. WHAT MIGHT WE EXPECT FROM A RISK-BASED ANALYSIS
OF REALIGNMENT?
One of the ironies of realignment’s focus on “stakes” as
opposed to “risks” is that counties may actually be receiving
former inmates who are actually “higher” risk than the
parolees who will be continuing on the caseloads of the state
parole agents. 53 We turn to this issue next.
As part of the Center for Evidence-Based Corrections’
realignment research conducted by Gerlinger, expected three
year recidivism rates for realigned parole and PRCS released
offenders were calculated, approximating the definitions of
non-serious, non-violent, and non-sex offenders in the
realignment legislation, using a released cohort of male
prisoners in 2005–06. 54 Because realignment was enacted in
late 2011, little available data existed on the actual
recidivism of parole and PRCS offenders; thus, the estimates
provide a glimpse into what we might expect. Assignment to
proxy groups mirrored the definition of offenders who would
be placed on parole or PRCS under realignment. For the
purposes of the study, an offender was considered to be in the
proxy-state parole group if he was a current serious/violent
offender, a high-risk sex offender (HRSO), or an offender with
mental health history who met certain conditions. 55 All
remaining offenders were considered proxy-PRCS offenders.
52. McCray et al., supra note 37, at 43.
53. Julie Gerlinger, California’s Public Safety Realignment: Examining the
Offending Patterns of Proxy-State Parole and Proxy-Post-Release Community
Supervision Groups (2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of California,
Irvine); see also McCray et al., supra note 37, at 48 (outlining such concerns as
raised by Lassen County).
54. Gerlinger, supra note 53.
55. Id. For example, an inmate had a mental health code indicating an
assignment to the Department of Mental Health or Crisis Bed, a participant in
the Enhanced Outpatient Program in a level III or IV prison, or a participant in
an Enhanced Outpatient Program serving a sentence for an offense listed in the
MDO criteria.
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Using data from the California Department of Justice
automated criminal history files, as well as CDCR automated
systems and the CSRA risk-of-recidivism tool, analyses
showed that approximately eighty percent of the proxy-PRCS
group was arrested within three years of release, compared to
seventy-one percent of the proxy-state parolees. 56 Fifty-two
percent of proxy-PRCS offenders were convicted of a crime,
compared to thirty-nine percent of proxy-state parolees. 57
This suggests that offenders the counties receive for PRCS
supervision are actually “higher” risk, as county
representatives have suggested. Or, in other words, the
serious, violent, and sex-offenders who will remain under
traditional parole have lower expected recidivism rates than
offenders to be supervised by the counties. Consistent with a
hypothesis that stakes is inversely related to risk to
recidivate, over half of proxy-parolees had “low” and
“moderate” CSRA scores. 58 In contrast, thirteen percent of
proxy-PRCS offenders had “low,” twenty-eight percent had
“moderate” and almost sixty percent had “high” risk scores. 59
A. Recommendations for Risk Assessment in Realignment
The use of risk assessment tools is considered a “best
practice” in the delivery of programming and treatment for
offenders. 60 It is good news that a large number of California
counties use or plan to use risk assessment tools to help
manage the realigned population.
Incorporating risk
assessment into departmental operations, however, raises a
number of issues, which are noted below.
Risk assessment tools are created and validated on
particular populations, which may or may not be similar to
the offender population in a particular county.
It is
important that a tool be validated with the population for
which it is being used, otherwise it may not be predictive, the
size of risk groups may be smaller or larger than expected,
and inaccurate information may provide the basis for
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., IMPLEMENTING EVIDENCEBASED POLICY AND PRACTICE IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 12 (2d ed. Oct.
2009).
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resulting decisions.
Training is important to make sure that tools are
consistently used. This helps not only in understanding the
technical aspects of administration, but also helps with a
“culture” change to the use of actuarial tools. The technology
transfer can be difficult, as many justice organizations have
historically used clinical or professional discretion in decisionmaking. Resistance is commonplace in the movement to
actuarial tools. Training is important to assure that staff
uses a tool the way it is supposed to be used. A tool is not
helpful if it is applied incorrectly.
Risk assessment tools do not exist in a vacuum. Risk and
needs information should be used in conjunction with
practitioner judgment and in the context of other information.
An assessment of risk does not, in and of itself, suggest
particular treatment or supervision strategies. Jurisdictions
must consider available resources and other system
constraints when matching risk levels to services.
Practitioner overrides of a risk tool can be allowed in order to
take into account information that may not be captured in the
instrument.
However, overrides should be kept to a
minimum or the tool becomes one of clinical (and generally
less accurate) decisions, rather than actuarial ones.
The research literature has provided strong evidence that
programming and services should be delivered to those at the
highest risk of recidivism. In fact, research has shown that
high intensive services delivered to low risk offenders can
have the opposite effect of what is intended. 61 Lower risk
offenders should receive fewer and less intensive services.
This may feel awkward to some practitioners, who feel that
lower risk individuals might be the most deserving of
resources.
And finally, one of the lessons about risk assessment is
that it can be a “risky” business. In the rollout of CDCR’s
Non-revocable Parole in 2010, errors in the assignment to
CSRA risk groups resulted in some higher risk parolees being
placed on virtually no supervision in the community after
release from prison. 62 Once discovered, it was corrected;

61. See D.A. Andrews & James Bonta, Rehabilitating Criminal Justice
Policy and Practice, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 45 (2010).
62. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 8.
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however, a media firestorm erupted in California, with calls
for an examination of the risk assessment tool itself as part of
an investigation by the California Inspector General. 63 One
politician stated he would approve a risk tool as long as it was
one hundred percent accurate. A sobering lesson is that not
only do we need to educate criminal justice practitioners
about risk tools, but we need to bring the broader public into
the discussion of the realities of risk-based approaches to
decision making.
CONCLUSION
Realignment has brought significant changes to the
California criminal justice system in an effort to reduce the
number of offenders in state prisons. At the same time, the
legislation itself does not consider “risk” of recidivism in
deciding appropriate candidates for local county supervision,
instead focusing more on the “stakes” of different offender
groups. Risk-based approaches, although not 100% accurate,
have garnered much support in the correctional literature
and are an important component of many counties’
management of offenders under realignment. Our analysis
suggests, ironically, that the “stakes” versus “risk” focus may
actually result in counties supervising among the most
criminally active offenders.

63. Id.

